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Abstract
The private for-profit sector’s prominence in healthcare delivery, and concern about its failures to deliver social benefit, have driven a search for interventions to improve the sector’s functioning. We review evidence on the effectiveness and limitations of such private sector interventions in low and middle income countries (LMIC).
There are few robust evaluations, but some conclusions are possible. Prohibiting the private sector is very unlikely to succeed, and regulatory approaches faces persistent challenges in many LMICs.  Attention is therefore turning to interventions that encourage private providers to improve quality and coverage, while advancing their financial interests, such as social marketing, social franchising, vouchers and contracting.  However, evidence on the impact on clinical quality, coverage, equity and cost-effectiveness remains limited. Other challenges concern scalability and scope, indicating the limitations of such interventions as a basis for universal health coverage, though they may address focused problems on a limited scale. 
Key messages 
	Engagement with private for-profit providers has occurred on four levels: prohibition, regulation, encouragement and subsidy, and purchase of services
	Despite experience with a rapidly growing number of interventions, there is a lack of robust evaluations, though some conclusions are possible
	Prohibiting the private sector where demand for services is high and capacity to regulate imperfect is very unlikely to succeed, and the ability to constrain private providers through statutory regulation is limited, especially in low income countries.
	There is some evidence that targeted supply side interventions such as social marketing and vouchers can increase coverage of focused services, but less evidence for accreditation and contracting, which seek to affect broad areas of service availability and quality. 
	For all these interventions little is known about their cost-effectiveness and ability to reach the poor.
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Introduction 
A well functioning health system can be considered as one that assures quality, delivers services in response to health needs as well as private demand, and assures provision of care to both rich and poor. While in principle a well functioning health system can comprise both private and public actors, it has been noted that private providers can function very poorly, with examples of pharmacy monopolies, price gouging specialists, induced demand for unnecessary diagnostic tests, purveyors of false medicines or fake miracle cures, and large gaps in coverage.1,2  These are systemic failures, driven by poor information, the misuse of market power, a failure to consider or lack of interest in  implications for the broader community such as drug resistance, and inequity in the distribution of income and knowledge. 
It is the combination of the private sector’s prominence in healthcare delivery in much of the world, and the common patterns of failure in many areas of private provision, that drives many governments, NGOs, private entrepreneurs and donor agencies to seek to intervene to improve the sector’s functioning.  Figure 1 summarises the outcomes of these market failures, and the four approaches for engaging with private providers to address these: (i) prohibition of private practice, (ii) constraint of its operation through regulation, (iii) encouragement and subsidy of private sector delivery for certain services, and (iv) purchase of services from the private sector.3 The main tools employed under each approach are indicated, which are all discussed in this paper.  Figure 1 also highlights that tool design must reflect the heterogeneity of private sector provision, in terms of the type of goods/services targeted and the type of private provider.
It is common to find tools from all of these approaches applied to different parts of the private sector simultaneously: for example forbidding private abortion services, restricting who may own and operate hospitals, subsidizing and encouraging provision of ante-natal vitamins through social marketing, and purchasing laboratory or dialysis services as part of the national health strategy.
In this paper we review experience with interventions concerning private for-profit providers in Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMIC) and assess what is known about their effectiveness and limitations.
This paper is based on findings from a systematic review of private sector interventions 4 and our analysis of published and grey-literature experiences with private sector health system policy activities in LMICs around the world, collected over many years of work in the field.  The core concepts have been developed through policy training courses in Asia, Europe, and North America with representatives from universities and health ministries of many countries.  Feedback from these policy makers and analysts has further refined our framework for understanding private sector engagement strategies.
1.	Prohibit
An extreme case of regulation by legal control is a formal ban on some or all forms of private practice. To be effective, any ban requires social support, enforcement capacity, or both.  Quite often, neither exists for restricting medical practices in low income countries, where monitoring challenges mean that prohibitory restrictions are particularly difficult to enforce for outpatient services or pharmaceutical sales.  By contrast, in many middle income countries regulatory capacity is sufficient to allow prohibition of some medical practices and an expansion of auditing and enforcement. 
Bans on practice by unlicensed providers are often the most visible type of prohibition, but examples of failure are numerous. In Tanzania, banning of private providers in the Nyerere era, from independence to the mid 1980s, drove them to practice undercover and within faith-based organisations but never eliminated private practice.5 In Cambodia, in 2010, the government created a new police force exclusively to enforce a ban on private drug sellers.  Two years later no change in drug seller practice was noticed and the force was allowed to lapse.6 Changes in the legal status of abortion services in many countries have driven women to, or away from, informal providers and their unsafe practices, but have had little effect on the overall number of abortions provided.7 
Examples of successful bans are rarer in low and middle income countries, documented primarily in strongly controlled socialist economies and reversed rapidly as those economies have opened.8,9

2.	Constrain
While complete prohibition of private health care providers is rare, some attempt to constrain private provider behaviour is ubiquitous, most commonly through regulation. The term regulation is used in varied ways in terms of the scope of activities considered. It is universally agreed to include statutory rules laid down by government or government appointed agencies, and also generally considered to include self-regulation implemented by professional bodies.  Many commentators stress the importance of thinking of regulation more broadly to encompass community accountability, subsidies, contracting arrangements, provider payment systems and quality improvement or assurance activities.10-12 The latter in particular form a key part of the hierarchy of “responsive regulation” which advocates that regulation begin with persuasion, dialogue and voluntary activities, only gradually escalating to mandatory or statutory processes and penalties where required.13 While recognising the importance of this wide range of measures for quality of care, our focus under “Constrain” is more tightly on statutory and self-regulatory constraints, with other strategies to improve private provider performance covered under “Encourage and Subsidise” and “Purchase” below. 
Statutory constraints in healthcare primarily encompass controls on the quality of facilities, human resources, medicines and equipment, through licensing of pharmacies, clinics and hospitals, and registration of health workers and products. 5,11,14 ADDIN EN.CITE  Other less common constraints aim to counter monopoly power of providers by regulating price, or controlling mergers or collusion. For example, in Niger there are regulations on wholesale and retail mark-ups for medicines, 15 and in India the government sets ceiling prices for essential drugs. 16 In a minority of cases regulation is used to address geographical equity: for instance in Tanzania legislation restricts registration of new pharmacies in areas where it is deemed there are an adequate number. 5 
Implementation and enforcement of statutory regulations are weak in many African and Asian settings, with some notable exceptions such as South Africa and the Seychelles. 12,17,18 ADDIN EN.CITE  The regulations themselves are often under-developed and out-dated, 12,18 with some countries not having updated their regulatory frameworks for over 40 years. 18  Many governments are not even aware of the scale of private health service provision taking place. The operation of unregistered hospitals and clinics is very common12: in two Indian states they outnumbered those with formal licences17 and in Africa only 6 out of 45 countries were reported to have a comprehensive registry of private facilities, with most lists “woefully incomplete and often inaccurate”. 18 In some settings, a high volume of medicines are sold by completely unauthorised outlets, such as market stalls and itinerant vendors in Niger. 15 
There is ample evidence of endemic regulatory infringement in pharmacies and drug stores that are permitted to sell medicines in many LMICs.  This relates both to inputs (e.g. lack of qualified dispensers or functioning refrigerators) and delivery of care (e.g. dispensing prescription-only medicines without a prescription, stocking unauthorised medicines, dispensing under-doses). For example, in Tamil Nadu, India, 61% of prescription-only medicines were dispensed without a prescription,19 with the range of such medicines often including antibiotics, steroids, narcotic analgesics, psychotropics, antihypertensives, sedatives, tranquilisers, anti-tuberculosis agents and abortifacients. A further concern is the quality of medicines themselves, with frequent documentation of both substandard products due to poor manufacture or storage, and deliberately falsified “fake” medicines. 20 Regulation of high-volume, low-cost, pharmaceutical commodities is difficult, and the incentives of pharmacies and retailers make it more so. 8,21  There is evidence, however, that in Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico, enforcement of prescription laws during the mid and late 2000s, contemporaneous to the expansion of pharmaceutical chains, drove a widespread reduction in over-the-counter sales of antibiotics and other prescription-only medicines. 22 This likely reflected both increased regulatory investment, and the desire of chains to reduce competition from low-cost, low-quality competitors. 23
Illegal practices are in some cases a response to demand, with providers refusing to acquiesce to client requests quickly losing custom to those that will. Inspections are often very rare, with some facilities not inspected for over a decade, 18 HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_17" \o ", 2011 #98"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>98</RecNum><DisplayText><style face="superscript">17</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>98</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="w0rs2ept8zed9oe5wtvv0tzxttx05ev292rv" timestamp="1409003203">98</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title>World Bank. Engaging the Private Sector to Improve Health in Africa: Healthy Partnerships</title><secondary-title>World Bank</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>World Bank</full-title></periodical><dates><year>2011</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>17 and revocation of hospital licences almost unheard of in many settings. 17,24 This may reflect inadequate capacity of inspection and judiciary agencies, which often lack resources to conduct inspections, and face severe shortages of staff, 17 who in some case are not even regularly paid. 18 This is complicated by overlapping mandates for regulation, which generally involve national and local public bodies, and require co-ordination with police and judicial offices to enforce penalties. 17,18 Poor implementation may also reflect lack of incentives for front line inspectors, their imperfect access to information, and “capture” of regulatory staff who come to identify with certain interest groups or providers, and may even own infringing retailers or facilities themselves. 12,14,21 For example in India the conditions for facility registration had been substantially weakened following contestation by doctors’ groups. 17 
There is also an acceptance by regulators in some settings that enforcing standards could increase the cost of provision beyond what could be afforded by poor communities. 25,26 For example, the employment of a pharmacist or even a lower level pharmacy cadre would not be viable for a business in rural Kenya. This has been argued to lead to a gap between the de jure regulation reflected in the country’s laws, and the de facto level of regulation that inspectors actually aim to enforce. 21 The resulting divergence between regulations and common practice provides extensive opportunities for corruption, for example in the form of routine bribe payments to avoid inspection visits or adverse reports. 26 
There has been little evaluation of introducing or improving regulations, with the exception of a few randomised controlled trials in pharmacies. 9,27,28  This lacuna partly reflects the challenges of conducting controlled evaluations of legal changes. However, the use of other approaches such as case studies and qualitative methods for rigorous investigation of regulatory implementation is also rare, 17,26,29 and there is a complete lack of evidence on the cost-effectiveness of regulatory strategies. 
Despite widespread evidence of poor implementation of statutory constraints, in most settings regulation does appear to have had some impact on the ordering of private sector provision, and in preventing degeneration into a completely ungoverned free market. For example, in many (though not all) settings most providers will have some form of health qualification, and the sale of medicines is often constrained to specific outlet types. 30 However, given the widespread failures of statutory regulation implementation, in recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the benefits of consumer based regulation, and compulsory and voluntary self-regulation schemes. 
Consumer based regulation can allow consumers to sue providers for adverse experiences and outcomes. In India, a Consumer Protection Act was passed in 1986, to be enforced through dedicated consumer courts. 31 Most studies report high awareness of the legislation by providers, and a high number complaints have been lodged by consumers. 32 However, the process can be lengthy and costly for consumers, 33 and it has been argued that outcomes are weighted in favour of defendants, with doctors sometimes receiving the “benefit of the doubt”. 17
Self-regulation by professional organisations is common, but also problematic in LMICs. 17 Delegating regulatory responsibilities to professional bodies is based on the rationale that they are well placed to assess performance, and that this can reduce government costs and improve enforcement. However, the organisations are often very poorly resourced, and not well placed to control providers, particularly providers that are well financed. 11 They also tend to place more emphasis on providing leadership and protection to the medical community, with minimal disciplining of members. 17  Requirements for licence renewal and continuous medical education are in place in only a minority of African countries. 18 
Accreditation is the most widespread form of voluntary self-regulation among hospitals, being well established throughout Europe and North America where it provides a process for combined external and peer-assessment of facility standards and quality processes. 34  While other forms of external quality assessment exist, for example ISO reviews or the Better Birth Checklist being applied in India, accreditation is the most widespread in healthcare.  Accreditation standards are commonly benchmarked among many hospitals, and revised regularly to account for widely shared improvements in quality norms.  The use of peer-assessors from other institutions also facilitates sharing of lessons between facilities.  
Accreditation is increasingly common in middle income countries where it is often a condition for reimbursement under national health insurance (eg: Thailand, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines). 35 ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Shaw</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>129</RecNum><DisplayText><style face="superscript">32</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>129</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="w0rs2ept8zed9oe5wtvv0tzxttx05ev292rv" timestamp="1409013546">129</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Shaw, C. D.</author><author>Braithwaite, J.</author><author>Moldovan, M.</author><author>Nicklin, W.</author><author>Grgic, I.</author><author>Fortune, T.</author><author>Whittaker, S.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Profiling health-care accreditation organizations: an international survey</title><secondary-title>Int J Qual Health Care</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Int J Qual Health Care</full-title></periodical><pages>222-31</pages><volume>25</volume><number>3</number><keywords><keyword>Accreditation</keyword><keyword>Data Collection</keyword><keyword>Delivery of Health Care</keyword><keyword>Hospitals</keyword><keyword>Humans</keyword><keyword>Questionnaires</keyword><keyword>Societies, Medical</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2013</year><pub-dates><date>Jul</date></pub-dates></dates><isbn>1464-3677</isbn><accession-num>23411832</accession-num><urls><related-urls><url>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23411832</url></related-urls></urls><electronic-resource-num>10.1093/intqhc/mzt011</electronic-resource-num><language>eng</language></record></Cite></EndNote> This conditionality of insurance payments has been shown to be effective at modifying provider practices in a positive way and as a result, programs have often been started following the introduction or expansion of national or social health insurance. 36 The evidence on the impact of accreditation is mixed, with some studies finding positive effects on clinical quality and patient outcomes while others find no effect. 37 The challenges with accreditation are largely twofold: they only work well if most hospitals in a country participate, and that only happens when participation is linked to reimbursements.  This makes accreditation in low income countries a challenging, and perhaps impossible, proposition. 38 Secondly, accreditation is expensive, and this cost must be borne by participating hospitals, and ultimately their clients.  For facilities at the high end of the market, accreditation with global agencies is a good investment: Bangkok’s Samitivej or Singapore’s Gleneagle hospitals both target, in part, rich medical tourists for whom accreditation with International Standards Oganization (ISO) or Joint Commission International (JCI) is an important indication of quality.  For facilities serving local populations in low- or middle-income countries or contracted by the public sector, the cost of accreditation may be harder to pass on to patients or purchasers. 
Other approaches to providing public information about provider quality include scorecards, surgical outcome comparisons and ‘know-your-rights’ campaigns, which are common in OECD countries. These approaches are only now being tested in small ways in LMICs, as in India where the White Ribbon Alliance has piloted a phone based system for new mothers to evaluate their delivery providers. 39
3.	Encourage and Subsidise 
Many governments and NGOs work to provide positive incentives to encourage the private sector to increase access to key health care interventions or to improve quality. This is most commonly done by offering training to private providers, social marketing of commodities, recruiting private providers into a social franchise network, providing targeted tax incentives to encourage investments or reduce end-user prices, and /or offering subsidies to potential clients. The number of these initiatives has increased substantially over the last two decades, often supported by donor funding or technical assistance. 
The underlying rationale for these approaches is an acknowledgement of the widespread accessibility and use of existing private providers, and therefore the opportunity they provide to improve coverage, while recognising important limitations to their current quality and product / service mix.  These strategies aim to reduce reliance on the consumer’s imperfect quality assessment and increase the control of quality through supply-side incentives and requirements. The services involved may include those with benefits for the wider community such as the treatment of infectious diseases, but many do not, justified rather by the need to address inequities in provision. Such expansion in provision may also reduce monopoly power, thus putting downward pressure on prices. 
It has become increasingly common for private providers to be included in free or subsidised publicly funded training programmes, to encourage the use of standard treatment guidelines throughout the health sector. 12,40 This is premised on the assumption that the main reasons for inadequate care relate to the inadequate knowledge of private providers, and that this can be addressed through short, focused training sessions. Examples would include 2 to 3 days training for shopkeepers on appropriate provision of antimalarial medicines in Kenya,41 short trainings on appropriate TB management by private practitioners in India, 42 or 35 days on dispensing and treatment practices for drug shop staff in Tanzania. 43  Training has often been combined with other strategies such as community information, pre-packaging of medicines, strengthened supervision, or feedback and negotiation sessions (e.g. INFECTOM). 21,43-45
However, there remains extensive evidence of a sizeable “know-do” gap among private providers. For example, while only 20% of pharmacists in Vietnam said they would sell antibiotics for a child with a viral upper respiratory tract infection, 83% did so when evaluated using mystery shoppers. 46  This has led many to question the use of training in isolation, and advocate interventions that draw on techniques and forms of business organisation common in the commercial sector, with the aim of harnessing these for public health ends.
Commodity social marketing applies commercial marketing techniques to create demand for products that have high public health value.  The promoted commodities are distributed, usually at a subsidized price, through for-profit retail outlets such as pharmacies, shops, drug-sellers and even bars.  Social marketing is the most common large-scale private sector intervention model in LMICs, with well over a hundred programmes in recent years in over 70 countries.  While family planning commodities were the most frequently socially marketed products throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, vitamins, nutritional supplements, antimalarials, and insecticide treated mosquito nets (ITNs) have also become common in the past twenty years. For example, social marketing of condoms began as part of family planning efforts, and was dramatically expanded in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. More recently artemisinin-based combination therapies have been promoted for malaria treatment in the private sector through the Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm) which subsidised these medicines at a supra-national level, while also promoting them through communication campaigns and provider training in selected countries. 47 
There are numerous examples of social marketing programmes operating at large and often national scales, and reasonable evidence that they can increase use of targeted products including condoms, oral contraceptives, insecticide treated nets, oral rehydration therapy and antimalarials. 33,47-49 In some situations there is an expectation that social marketing can “shape” the market by establishing new products, changing consumer habits, and stimulating private sector supply, potentially making an unsubsidised market more feasible in future. By contrast, there has been concern that promotion of own-branded products by a social marketing agency may crowd-out purely private sector alternatives from the market, possibly making the market less viable should the social marketing agency withdraw50. In the market for ITNs in Tanzania, this led to a switch from a “traditional social marketing model” to a “manufacturers’ model”, where the social marketing agency promoted a set of approved products from local manufacturers, but in most programmes the promotion of own-brands has continued. Other debates have continued over the relative cost-effectiveness and equity impact of social marketing in comparison to alternative commodity delivery strategies such as free public provision and community health worker services. 33,51 
Social marketing focuses on public health commodities that can generally be delivered to end users with relatively little or no accompanying service by a health care professional. 52  By contrast social franchising has been used for enhancing delivery of more complex services, provided principally in clinics or small hospitals.  Social franchises “attempt to use franchising methods to achieve social rather than financial goals”, 53  by linking pre-existing private health practitioners in a network to provide socially beneficial services under a common brand 54. Franchising comprises a contractual arrangement between one firm (the franchisor) and a second firm (the franchisee) which has the right to market goods or services under the franchisor’s brand name. Franchises may be “stand-alone” where the franchisee exclusively provides franchised products/services, or “fractional” where the franchisee provides both a package of services under the franchise and unfranchised product lines. 55  While frequently the franchisor is an NGO, there are a growing number of government and for-profit social franchises. 56 Franchisees may pay a fee to the franchisor in some cases, but aspects of the franchise package such as training and marketing are often funded solely by the franchisor i.e. subsidised.
Social franchises have been documented in over 20 countries and their numbers have increased rapidly, doubling every four years since 1994, with over 90 tracked by the SF4health.org website. 56,57  The range of services provided through franchised clinics has also increased, with over half of current programmes supporting multiple services, most commonly including family planning, reproductive health, safe deliveries, and diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, pneumonia, and paediatric diarrhoea.  An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 individual clinics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America currently operate as part of social franchise networks. 54,58 
A key goal of these networks is to improve quality of care provision. Improvements in user satisfaction and perceptions of quality have been documented in most, though not all, franchises studied, but the impact on objectively measured clinical quality of service delivery has been much less rarely demonstrated. 57,59 Social franchising has been shown to increase client volume at franchised clinics, and occasionally has been shown to increase overall utilisation at the community level, though this has not been demonstrated for maternal or reproductive health services. 57 Key concerns raised about social franchising models include the difficulty of controlling clinical quality, especially for more complex services, and the equity impact, with most evidence showing that franchised clinics tend to serve clients with high socio-economic status relative to clients of non-franchised clinics or the general population. 57 
4.	Purchase 
Purchasing of some private goods and services is common throughout all public health systems and in most instances non-controversial.  Few would suggest that government health services manufacture their own beds, bricks or water filters, or their own pharmaceutical, consumable, or preventative products such as antibiotics, sterile gloves, or mosquito nets.  More complex purchasing commitments, often described using the umbrella term “contracting”, can be more controversial, depending on the nature of the service concerned. Nevertheless, contracting for narrowly defined service components is commonplace in many health delivery systems. Examples include contracts for dialysis centres in South Africa and the Philippines, and laboratory or pharmaceutical distribution services in Tanzania, Zambia, and Mali. Contracts have also involved a range of financing, construction, and operations models for hospital infrastructure expansion, and sometimes the provision of clinical services as well, in Brazil, Mexico, Lesotho, Thailand and many other countries. 60-62   There is no systematic evidence from LMICs on the relative quality of contracted private vs. public facilities, 63,64  while the evidence from wealthy countries is limited and contradictory. 65,66
Contracting arrangements are at times fiscally pragmatic, leveraging private funds for initial infrastructure investments to expand capacity faster than government funds alone allow.  In other instances, contracting arrangements are a recognition that private expertise can fill a specialized need better than government (e.g. dialysis or pharmaceutical logistics management), or allow more rapid expansion of service provision. For example, many countries contract NGOs for the provision of family planning and reproductive health services to augment what government clinics alone can provide. Such contracts may be particularly favoured where there is an attempt to avoid controversy or serve stigmatized patients, such as sex workers or drug users who may have reasons to be cautious in government facilities.  
Contracting for all primary care provision in a defined geographical area has also been implemented, most commonly in fragile and post-conflict states where government capacity to delivery care is, or was, low. Such contracts have been studied extensively in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. 67-71  Although these contract bids were open to for-profit providers, in the end all large-scale contracts of this sort were delivered through non-profits.  While there is some evidence that contracting out is able to deliver both effective services and cost-effectiveness, this is not always the case and it has nearly always been used as a temporary solution to assuring public service provision, most commonly at the instigation of external donors or global health institutions working in situations where national health systems are fragile. 72  Once stability is assured, governments have shown a strong preference for resumption of traditional government-owned-and-operated primary care.  The experience of Cambodia illustrates this well, where contracting was introduced at the instigation of the Asian Development Bank, showed many successes, but was rapidly dismantled once the Bank requirements were completed and government capacity had grown. 73 
In addition to directly contracting private services, governments can also indirectly purchase services by providing vouchers to users, which can also facilitate targeting subsidies at a particular group such as the poor. Vouchers are included under the umbrella of output-based aid or results-based-financing programmes as the payment of providers is linked to outputs (services delivered) rather than inputs. In a typical voucher programme, donor or government funds are given to a targeted population for targeted goods or services in the form of a paper or electronic voucher which can be used at previously approved public and/or private providers who are subsequently reimbursed.  A variant of this approach is to base eligibility of users on possession of identification indicating their poverty status, such as the use of the Below Poverty Line (BPL) card in India to access private sector maternal health services under the Chiranjivee Yojana programme. 74  In a number of cases voucher payment initiatives have been added to established clinic social franchises.  Vouchers have been used for family planning services, vaccinations, treatment of sexually transmitted illnesses (STIs), deliveries, ante-natal care and vitamins, and to increase uptake of ITNs. An advantage is that the funds can be targeted to low-income or high-risk individuals in specific geographic areas. It is also hypothesised that quality of care will be increased as providers strive to be included in the voucher programme, and in some programmes to compete for the custom of voucher recipients.  
Since 1995 voucher programmes have grown rapidly in number, building upon the well documented experience of ICAS in Nicaragua where targeted payments for STI treatment have been in place for 15 years. 75-79  Another well-documented example is the provision of vouchers to women attending public sector ante-natal clinics in Tanzania to cover part of the cost of ITN purchase from private retailers. 80-84  Financial support for voucher programmes has particularly come from the World Bank-housed Global Program for Output Based Aid (GPOBA) and the German Development Bank, KfW.  As of 2008, 19 voucher programmes are reported in LMICs (figure 1). 85 
Available evidence shows that vouchers have been associated with increased use of targeted health services. 86-88  There is modest evidence that they can be associated with improvements in quality of care and effective targeting to specific populations, but the impact on population level health outcomes is inconclusive. 86-88 No clear evidence is available on the relative cost-effectiveness of vouchers as a method of subsidizing health services. Concerns include the potential for fraud around voucher reimbursement, and the costs of identifying accurately both recipients and providers of suitable quality. 85,89,90  ADDIN EN.CITE  
Discussion and Conclusions	
In many low- and middle-income countries such as, China, Cambodia, Paraguay, Senegal , Nigeria, and Ghana, health expenditure is increasing at more than ten per cent a year. 91   The situation in each country is different, however all share a challenge common to almost all developing countries: how best to interact with private providers to create a well functioning health system?
To answer this, policy makers can draw on several decades of experience with private sector intervention, involving prohibition of providers deemed undesirable, regulation to control poor quality and unsafe practices, encouragement and expansion of private provision to increase access, and contracting of private services to supply publicly funded care. Unfortunately, much of this experience remains imperfectly documented, with a notable lack of robust evaluations. To some degree this reflects neglect of this area of research; it also reflects the inherent challenges of studying interventions that often require research methods less well accepted than the randomized trials that are the gold standard for much health research. 
However, some conclusions are possible from the experience to date. First we know that some approaches will not work, at least in isolation. It seems clear that prohibiting the operation of the private sector where demand for services is high and capacity to regulate imperfect, is doomed to failure. Furthermore, the ability to constrain private providers through statutory control is very limited, especially in low-income countries, with many governments not even knowing the extent of private sector operation. Self-regulation cannot be relied on to fill the gap as in most settings professional organisations function more like trade unions than effective regulators. We also know that even after training there is often a substantial gap between knowledge and practice40,92. That is not to say that regulation and training have no value - training may be an important first step where provider knowledge is highly imperfect, and in many settings regulation does prevent a complete free for all of quack practitioners and fake drug peddlers. Strong regulatory capacity is central to the safe and effective provision of private sector care in OECD countries, and should be the medium- and long-term priority for low-income countries.  In the near-term, however, attention is increasingly turning to interventions that encourage private providers to improve the quality and coverage of their care, while advancing their own financial interests.
These approaches include social marketing, social franchising, accreditation, vouchers and contracting. There is evidence that social marketing and vouchers can increase coverage of targeted services and commodities, though there are clear limits to the types of interventions that social marketing can deliver, as it is unsuitable for even mildly complex services. Robust evidence on the impact of social franchising, accreditation and contracts is more limited; although there are clearly some positive outcomes, we lack strong evidence that they can improve technical quality of care and community level coverage. For all these interventions, the evidence of their ability to reach poorer groups is very limited,93 and little is known about their cost-effectiveness. 
With all interventions in the “encourage & subsidise” category, key challenges are likely to be expanding them in both scale and scope. For example, the intensive nature of support and monitoring of facilities required for social franchising is likely to make rapid geographical scale up very difficult. Vouchers may work well for a targeted set of services, but would be hard to use for provision of health services more generally. Sustainability is also a concern, given that strategies such as social marketing, social franchising and vouchers require substantial continued subsidy, and are currently almost entirely funded by extra-national donors and implemented through NGOs. Donor preferences for these tools stem from their focused nature, the effectiveness of targeting to prioritized health services or particular populations, and the efficiency gains resulting from funding work outside of large, often inefficient, and reputedly ineffective or corrupt, national bureaucracies. 
The above concerns indicate the limitations of the “encourage and subsidise” tools as a basis for large scale public-private engagement, and the provision of universal health coverage. Rather they can be considered to function more as “band-aids” or at best “bandages” – potentially effective at addressing a focused problem on a limited scale, but in no way a solution to the systemic, broad based challenges of the whole health system. Broader based solutions do potentially exist in the form of a combination of accreditation, contracting and regulation. Though unlikely to be implementable in low-income settings, they are becoming increasingly feasible as incomes and capacity rise in middle-income countries, and collective financing and purchasing can be used to effectively steer private sector development.  
In sum, the private sector is increasingly hard to ignore, and the costs of ignoring it could be very high in public health terms. A range of tools exist for engagement, and experience with these has rapidly developed in recent years. The choice of appropriate approach will vary substantially depending on the health system failures being addressed, the nature of the healthcare product / service, the type of provider, and that level of development of the country both in terms of income levels and health system organisation (Figure 1).
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